The New York Times manages to dig deeper than a lot of the analysis about the Sa’ada War and brings out an important concept: aspects of the Yemeni military are beyond Saleh’s control. Many see the unending war in Sa’ada as a strategic maneuver on Saleh’s part to weaken General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar. Whenever Saleh is facing pressure, viola, there’s a new crisis to deflect and distract. Crisis as tool of domestic and foreign policy extends sometimes to “terror attacks” as well as war. The article also nails the roots of the growth and strength of the rebel forces- “The government’s bombing raids, and its use of thuggish tribesman as a proxy force, infuriated the local population in Saada.” The article also touches on “the government’s policy of using sectarian and tribal animosities to further its goals.” Saleh labels his opponents as apostates, and the takfiri ideology, not the constitution, underpins his authority. Saleh relies on fundamentalism and fundamentalists to survive and push back the forces of modernity, reform and progress.
Many in Yemen’s own government say the conflict is less about controlling terrain — always a tenuous prospect in this tribally splintered country — than about Mr. Saleh’s struggle to reassert his military powers, in the face of widening insurgencies and intensifying political rivalry in the capital.
“Saleh started this war mainly because he wants his son to succeed him, and many in the military and government do not accept this,” said one high-ranking Yemeni official who spoke on the condition of anonymity, echoing an analysis that is often heard here. “With a war, people rally around him, even the United States, because they fear chaos in Yemen if he falls.”
Ottawa International Poets and Writers for human Rights (OIPWHR)
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